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SUBJECT: Peace Plan Reactions in Honduras

1. Following is summary of reactions gained during day spent with NR leaders on 9 August.

a. Night of 7 August, we learned Secretary of State wanted to talk to Adolfo Calero by phone. We contacted Calero [redacted] and arranged for him to take call [redacted] as soon as he arrived from Guatemala on 8 August. He brought Aristides Sanchez along and COM [redacted] had opportunity to discuss peace plan between SecState call and one arranged later with House Speaker. Directors displayed full range of expected reactions: concern, confusion, apprehension, expectation regarding USG eventual position. Mood swing from near depression to bursts of creative thought on how to move from this point. Consensus was that Sandinistas would not comply with peace accord terms but would use time bought by plan to drag on negotiations and watch NR wither away. Directors' general view is that rapid action must be taken to show the world and Congress that plan is fraud and new money must be voted. Ideas generated included: immediate internal political opposition thresholding to push Sandinistas into repression; influx of a score or more prominent exile politicians under amnesty provision, again to provoke GON; agree to ceasefire if GON releases some 9,000 political prisoners and grants full freedom of press. Calero and Sanchez believe GON would never agree to these terms and Central American signatories might be forced to rescind their plan over short term. Calero was encouraged by conversations with SecState, Elliott Abrams and Speaker, but overall, both remained more down than up.

b. Foursome, accompanied also by [redacted] CODEL Lukens then went to Aguacate. Apart from CODEL program, we discussed situation with Enrique Bermudez, who also did not do good job at hiding his discouragement. He was given copy of directorate declaration, with which he was in accord. He agreed he needed to send another message inside along lines of directorate declaration to try to avoid impairment of morale and motivation. He seemed somewhat uncertain about how successful this would be. Calero and Sanchez at same time were holding nearby question-and-answer session with Aureliano, Rigoberto, Micenciado, Invisible and others. [redacted]

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c. Subsequent short discussion with Bermudez to bolster him was joined by Calero and Sanchez. Bermudez was uncertain about whether he should include in message to troops the idea that their pressure was responsible for getting GON to sign plan. He simply does not believe plan is a step in the right direction and fears losing credibility by declaring a victory when what he really sees as a potential, if not probable, disastrous political defeat. Sanchez supported these doubts. Bermudez was advised to use his incomparable experience and instincts on how to talk to his comandantes but to make his message encouraging and motivational.

d. Regarding military action, after we briefed Bermudez the other day on the U.S. plan, he instructed field commanders to step up pace to gain best possible tactical advantage prior to possible ceasefire. He promised to reaffirm this instruction. We asked him to think through strategic and tactical plans to achieve this and we would work together to adapt resupply priorities to this plan.

e. Minus COM and Sanchez, group went on to Rus Rus for meeting with Blas and his staff. Intelligent questions on where the peace plans leaves the Atlantic Coast struggle were answered by Calero, Congressman Lukens *
 most encouraging answers we could muster.

3. In sum, our resistance leaders here feel sold out, boxed in and quite discouraged. Nevertheless, they believe Sandinistas will never comply with real terms, and if we quickly formulate a plan, move aggressively, take some risks, it is still possible to turn the tables. Calero and Sanchez agree an early directorate meeting is a must. Everyone is anxiously awaiting the USG and congressional reactions.

4. Will stay in touch with directorate members, begin to think about military and resupply strategy and follow up with Sanchez to encourage maximum infiltration and aggressive action. Meanwhile, request you look closely at pending requests for helicopter spare parts, turnover of two H models to EPN, etc. to ensure we and Bermudez can operate at full efficiency.

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